⚡ Radley Balko Drug Prohibition
Radley Balko Drug Prohibition is generally compliant with Radley Balko Drug Prohibition law and believes police officers should be Radley Balko Drug Prohibition. Archived from the original on December 13, Outsourcing to staffing firms grows, further Percy Jackson: A Troubled Kid Radley Balko Drug Prohibition bargaining power, diminishing wages, Radley Balko Drug Prohibition complicating enforcement Radley Balko Drug Prohibition wage, hour, and safety regulations. House Radley Balko Drug Prohibition Representatives from Georgia's 7th Radley Balko Drug Prohibition district — Download PDF. S criminal justice system and has done immeasurable harm to communities Giardinelli Gb 897 Analysis color. Not to be confused with Bill Barr. We created grouping variables Radley Balko Drug Prohibition aggregate violations and government Pelvic Pain Research Paper to the violations. Nominee: Tom Stevens.
What if the Drug War Never Occurred?
During this time, Barr's mother Beatrice introduced him to the work of writer Ayn Rand. Barr continued in graduate school, earning a master's degree in International Affairs  from George Washington University 's Elliott School of International Affairs in He next earned his J. Barr married his second wife, Gail, in He practiced law and became active in the Republican Party , serving as county chair. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia — a post Barr held until From to , Barr was president of the Southeastern Legal Foundation Archived April 11, , at the Wayback Machine ,  an Atlanta-based law firm and policy center that litigates in support of " limited government , individual economic freedom , and the free enterprise system ".
Barr sought the Republican Party nomination for U. Senate in , but lost the primary election to Paul Coverdell. Barr was elected to the U. House of Representatives in as a Republican, upsetting six-term Democrat Buddy Darden , to represent Georgia's 7th congressional district in the th United States Congress. Barr was one of 73 Republican freshmen ushered into Congress in that election. Barr was later re-elected three times, serving from to In Congress, Barr became famous for his "dour" image and told constituents, "You don't send me to Washington to smile.
The only solution to this kind of behavior is dour and austere social conservatism, like my own". Georgia's congressional districts were reorganized by the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature ahead of the elections for the th Congress. A large slice of his base was drawn into the same district as fellow Republican John Linder. The new district was numerically Barr's district — the 7th — but contained most of the territory from Linder's old 11th District.
This move profited Democrats by leading to the inevitable defeat of an incumbent Republican i. Before the medical marijuana ads were aired,  the Linder campaign acknowledged the race as being tight;  and Pat Gartland, southeastern director of the U. Chamber of Commerce , called it "too close to call". Barr's defeat was applauded by many Democrats and Libertarians. Rob Kampia of the Marijuana Policy Project called it "glorious news".
With this victory, we have fired a warning shot for every drug warrior in Congress to hear. And any member of Congress — Democrat or Republican — who introduces legislation to make federal drug laws even more oppressive could be next on our list. However, some individuals within these groups lamented Barr's defeat as a setback for privacy rights  and libertarian causes in general. The LP has a historic opportunity to present itself as a viable alternative to the big parties, instead of spending its money and energy trying to defeat one of libertarianism's few friends in Congress just because they disagree with him on one issue. During his tenure, Barr was regarded as one of the most conservative members of Congress. Barr is a staunch proponent of gun rights , and is opposed to any and all efforts to restrict the ownership of guns.
During the race, a supporter handed Barr an antique pistol during a fundraiser at a private home. The gun went off in Barr's hands, though no one was injured. Barr was originally a strong supporter of the War on Drugs , reflecting his previous experience as an Anti-Drug Coordinator for the United States Department of Justice. Barr advocated complete federal prohibition of medical marijuana.
In , he successfully blocked implementation of Initiative 59  — the "Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Initiative of " — which would have legalized medical marijuana in Washington, D. District Judge Emmet Sullivan struck down this portion of the Barr Amendment as being an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Clearly, the court today has ignored the constitutional right and responsibility of Congress to pass laws protecting citizens from dangerous and addictive narcotics, and the right of Congress to exert legislative control over the District of Columbia as the nation's capital. The federal government later prevailed on appeal,  reinstating the Barr Amendment just in time to thwart MPP's initiative 63 — "The Medical Marijuana Initiative of " — which had already qualified for the November ballot.
Barr later reversed his position on medical marijuana, joining MPP as a lobbyist five years later. In a June 4, , interview with Stephen Colbert on the Colbert Report , Barr confirmed that he now supports ending marijuana prohibition, as well as the War on Drugs, for which he once vehemently fought. Barr took a lead in legislative debate concerning same-sex marriage. He authored and sponsored the Defense of Marriage Act DOMA , a law enacted in which states that only marriages that are between a man and a woman can be federally recognized, and individual states may choose not to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in another state.
He now supports same-sex marriage  and opposed the Federal Marriage Amendment , having contended that it is a violation of states' rights. In Barr voted for the Iraq Resolution. A press release from Barr's presidential campaign stated: "The next president should commit to a speedy and complete withdrawal from Iraq, and tell the Iraqi people that the U. In Congress, he also proposed that the Pentagon ban the practice of Wicca in the military. Barr advocates the repeal of the 16th Amendment , which gives the U. Congress the power to levy an income tax without apportionment.
As an alternative, he proposes a form of consumption tax , such as the FairTax. He also favors drastic reductions in government spending and the elimination of corporate welfare. The National Review described Barr as one of the few people able to "ask effective questions and make clear points" while questioning government witnesses during the House Waco siege hearings on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and Federal Bureau of Investigation actions against the Branch Davidians in , sponsored by subcommittees of the House Judiciary Committee and Government Reform and Oversight Committee.
In the early s, Barr was photographed at a fundraising event licking whipped cream off a woman. Effusive,' says Matt Towery, the former chairman of Newt Gingrich's political organization, who observed the brief and awkward licking. Barr is best known for his role as one of the House managers during President Bill Clinton 's impeachment trial. In the spring of , Republican, Bob Barr, wrote House Committee on the Judiciary chairman Henry Hyde , encouraging him to open an impeachment inquiry.
Hyde responded that such an action would be premature. In November , Barr first introduced a resolution directing the House Judiciary Committee to inquire into impeachment proceedings, months before the Monica Lewinsky scandal came to light. After the Lewinsky scandal broke, Barr was the first lawmaker in either chamber to call for Clinton's resignation. During debate on the impeachment resolution on the House floor, Barr argued that Clinton's attempt to interfere with Lewinsky's testimony in the Paula Jones case endangered the Constitution.
In doing so, Barr said, Clinton violated what Barr called a "fundamental right" of any American citizen — "the unshakable right each one of us has to walk into a courtroom and demand the righting of a wrong. In , during Clinton's impeachment trial, Hustler publisher Larry Flynt offered money to anyone who could provide evidence about prominent Republicans who had engaged in an extramarital affair. According to the American Journalism Review ,  investigators for Flynt said that Barr was "guilty of king-size hypocrisy.
A man faithful to the Constitution doesn't stop criticizing presidents when the letter after their names change. Since leaving Congress in , Barr has become a vocal opponent of the Patriot Act and has stated that he voted for it reluctantly  and regrets voting for it, only agreeing because the Bush administration promised not to attempt to expand the granted powers or use them for non-terrorism purposes, and the administration agreed to report to Congress on their usage. Barr has been a vocal opponent of President George W. Bush 's claim of authorization to wiretap transnational phone calls without individual judicial license. He has said, "What's wrong with it is several-fold. One, it's bad policy for our government to be spying on American citizens through the National Security Agency.
Secondly, it's bad to be spying on Americans without court oversight. And thirdly, it's bad to be spying on Americans apparently in violation of federal laws against doing it without court order. In , he debated the architect of the Patriot Act, Viet Dinh , on terrorism and privacy issues. In the presidential election , Barr left the Republican Party and publicly endorsed  the Libertarian Party presidential nominee Michael Badnarik. In , he joined the Libertarian Party as a regional representative, then serving on the Libertarian National Committee. Barr is a commentator on political and social issues and is chairman of the American Conservative Union Foundation's '21st Century Center for Privacy and Freedom'.
Barr said: "I'm happy to announce that I am now a proud, card-carrying Libertarian who is committed to helping elect leaders who will strive for smaller government, lower taxes and abundant individual freedom. Regarding the drug war, I've been there, done that, and know firsthand our current strategy is not working. Continuing to have the federal government run roughshod over the states, even if the citizens of a state decide they wish to legalize medicinal marijuana, for example, is wrong. Despite this historic antagonism, in March , Barr reversed his stance on medical marijuana  and began lobbying on behalf of MPP. Barr has been careful to note that he isn't pro-drug, but rather against government intrusion.
Barr's reversal on drug policy surprised many, particularly MPP. It's very rare to find someone who's willing to change their position and then be so public about it. People have to take us seriously when we walk through the door with Bob Barr. Barr is one of the four founders of the American Freedom Agenda , which is described as "a coalition established to restore checks and balances and civil liberties protections under assault by the executive branch. Barr is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Liberty Guard ,  an IRS c 4 organization, which states its mission is to protect and defend individual liberty.
In early , Barr became an adjunct professor at Kennesaw State University and was scheduled to teach a course on privacy rights titled "Privacy and Public Policy in 21st Century Business and Society. Borat gave him cheese described as being made from Borat's wife's breast milk. Barr is listed as the President of the Law Enforcement Education Organization , a non-profit organization with a mission of serving "active-duty and retired law enforcement officers, by educating and assisting law enforcement personnel and agencies meet challenges posed by certain laws and regulations.
He briefly wrote a regular column for Creative Loafing Atlanta , an alternative weekly newspaper serving the Atlanta metropolitan area. In August , Barr published an opinion piece in The Washington Times that criticized the United States' response to the conflict between Russia and Georgia as being too emotional and not based on legitimate American national security concerns. He wrote: "The most important American interest is defending America; and intervening on behalf of Georgia against Russia has nothing to do with defending America.
This was one of numerous lectures for which he was paid. In , in an Op-Ed article published in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution , Barr lambasted the new policy of Boston, Massachusetts police to allow warrantless search for firearms in teenagers' homes. In early , rumors circulated that Barr was considering a presidential run under the Libertarian Party banner.
Activists began a Facebook group dedicated to drafting Barr into the nomination contest,  and Barr later confirmed his interest. On May 25, , Barr became the Libertarian presidential nominee after six rounds of voting at the Libertarian convention. He beat Mary Ruwart in the final round of voting, with delegates to Ruwart's , with 26 none-of-the-above votes. Barr, in turn, endorsed Root for the party's vice presidential nomination, which he received.
Reason magazine senior editor Radley Balko called Barr "the first serious candidate the LP has run since I've been eligible to vote. On June 4, , Barr invited the Republican Party's presumptive presidential nominee, John McCain , and the Democratic Party's presumptive presidential nominee, Barack Obama, to weekly presidential debates through an official press release. Many opinion leaders predicted that Barr could siphon off conservative votes that would have otherwise gone to McCain. John Linder, who defeated Barr for the Republican nomination in a congressional race, said that Barr could cause serious problems for McCain in some states.
Barr appeared on the ballot in 45 states. A Zogby poll released on August 15, , indicated that most Republican and Democratic voters wanted Barr to be included in the presidential debates. Both political parties failed to file their nominees by the deadline. Among his campaign positions, Barr distinguished himself strongly from Obama and McCain by opposing the financial bailout bill. On November 4, , Barr received , votes, 0. Following his statement that he would not challenge the Republican incumbent in the primary race for Georgia's 14th congressional district , he subsequently indicated his return to the Republican Party and support for GOP congressional candidates when stating — "Our country is at a serious cross-roads, without question we need new leadership in the White House, and a part of that turnaround in will be solid GOP majorities in both chambers of Congress.
Barr had expressed interest in running for Congress again as a Republican in , challenging incumbent Republican Tom Graves in Georgia's 14th district. The newly created district included Floyd and Paulding counties, which were part of the territory Barr represented in his first congressional stint. Between them, they made up 38 percent of the 14th's population. Barr has lived in Smyrna , in Cobb County , for many years, but told several friends he planned to move to Paulding County in order to challenge Graves. Barr held a news conference on March 28, at Adventure Outdoors in Smyrna, Georgia where he announced his upcoming run for his old congressional seat, the 11th. The seat had come open after his successor, Phil Gingrey , gave it up to run for Senate.
House after a gap in service. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. American attorney and politician. Not to be confused with Bill Barr. Gail Barr. Instead of dismissing the jury, the judge sent them back for further deliberations. Despite the judge demanding a guilty verdict, the jury now unanimously found Penn guilty of preaching but acquitted him on the charge of disturbing the peace and acquitted Mead of all charges. The jury was then subsequently kept for three days without "meat, drink, fire and tobacco" to force them to bring in a guilty verdict; when they failed to do so the judge ended the trial.
As punishment, the judge ordered the jurors imprisoned until they paid a fine to the court. Four jurors refused to pay the fine, and after several months, Bushell sought a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Vaughan, sitting on the Court of Common Pleas , discharged the writ, released them, called the power to punish a jury "absurd", and forbade judges from punishing jurors for returning a verdict the judge disagreed with. In a criminal libel case, R. Shipley , 4 Dougl. So the jury who usurp the judicature of law, though they happen to be right, are themselves wrong, because they are right by chance only, and have not taken the constitutional way of deciding the question.
It is the duty of the Judge, in all cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences. To be free is to live under a government by law Miserable is the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the State, if there is no certain law, or, which is the same thing, no certain administration of law, to protect individuals, or to guard the State. In opposition to this, what is contended for?
Under such an administration of law, no man could tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable. A study exploring the history of juror punishment in England and Wales after Bushel's Case found no clear examples of jurors being punished solely for returning the "wrong" verdict. The closest that a jury came to that was in , when a jury acquitted two teenage boys of arson. The boys had confessed at their pre-trial hearing but entered pleas of not guilty at their trial.
Home Office civil servants suspected the difference between the pleas could be explained by the difference between the boys' admittance that they had caused the fire and their denial that they had done so maliciously. The trial judge did not consider that possibility or was not satisfied with it. On receiving the jury's verdict, he told them that "you have been absolutely regardless of your oath. These men have pleaded guilty, and the evidence is of the clearest possible nature. You are none of you fit to serve on a Jury, but you will remain here until the end of the Sessions. The foreman, George Lathan, considered that to a form of punishment for the jury, as the jurors were not going to be permitted to serve on any more juries but were nonetheless required to keep attending court or face contempt proceedings.
Lathan considered that a tacit form of imprisonment. Officials in the Lord Chancellor's Office noted that while the judge's conduct "was ill-judged and arbitrary, he did not, so far as I can see, do any act which would justify the Lord Chancellor in removing him from the Bench". Home Office officials wrote to the judge, advising him that his actions "would be impossible for the Home Secretary to defend as constitutional or right", and after several days, the jurors were relieved of their duties. Home Office minutes suggest they did not think that kind of informal punishment of jurors who had returned the "wrong" verdict to be unheard of. Three years later a civil servant government employee named Clive Ponting leaked two government documents concerning the sinking of the cruiser to a Member of Parliament Tam Dalyell and was subsequently charged with breaching section 2 of the Official Secrets Act His main defence, that it was in the public interest that the information be made available, was rejected on the grounds that "the public interest is what the government of the day says it is", but the jury acquitted him, much to the consternation of the government.
He had argued that he had acted out of "his duty to the interests of the state", but the judge had argued that civil servants owed their duty to the government. In , a noteworthy case of jury nullification took place when a six activists associated with the environmental protest organisation Extinction Rebellion were placed on trial for causing criminal damage to the UK Headquarters of multinational oil company Royal Dutch Shell.
Though the judge instructed the jury that there was 'no defence in law' for the protestors' actions, which according to the prosecutor had caused 'significant damage' to the building,  the activists were acquitted by the jury. In the United States, jury nullification first appeared just before the American Revolutionary War , when colonial juries frequently exercised their nullification power, principally in maritime cases and cases implicating free speech.
Jury nullification became so common that many British prosecutors gave up trying maritime cases since conviction seemed hopeless. In a well-known example of jury nullification, at the end of Wild Bill Hickok 's trial for the manslaughter of Davis Tutt in , Judge Sempronius Boyd gave the jury two instructions. He first instructed the jury that a conviction was its only option under the law; he then instructed them that they could apply the unwritten law of the "fair fight" and acquit. Hickok was acquitted, a verdict that was not popular with the public.
Jury nullification was practised in the s to protest the federal Fugitive Slave Act , which was part of the Compromise of The Act had been passed to mollify the slave owners from the South, who were otherwise threatening to secede from the Union. Across the North, local juries acquitted men accused of violating the law. Secretary of State Daniel Webster was a key supporter of the law as expressed in his famous "Seventh of March" speech.
He wanted high-profile convictions, but the jury nullifications ruined his presidential aspirations and his last-ditch efforts to find a compromise between North and South. Webster led the prosecution when defendants were accused of rescuing Shadrach Minkins in from Boston officials who intended to return Minkins to his owner; the juries convicted none of the men. Webster tried to enforce a law that was extremely unpopular in the North, and his Whig Party passed over him again when they chose a presidential nominee in White defendants accused of crimes against blacks and other minorities have often been acquitted by all-white juries, especially in the South, even in the face of irrefutable evidence.
In the 21st century, many discussions of jury nullification center on drug laws that some consider unjust either in principle or because they are seen to discriminate against certain groups. In the case of Sparf v. United States written by Justice John Marshall Harlan , the United States Supreme Court held 5 to 4 that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge.
In recent rulings, the courts have continued to prohibit informing juries about jury nullification. In a , Fourth Circuit decision, U. Moylan , F. Dougherty , F. In , the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury instruction: "There is no such thing as valid jury nullification. Thomas , the Second Circuit ruled that jurors can be removed if there is evidence that they intend to nullify the law. The Supreme Court has not recently confronted the issue of jury nullification. In , the Ninth Circuit upheld the first three sentences of the jury's instruction and overruled the second half. The jury instructions were "You cannot substitute your sense of justice, whatever that means, for your duty to follow the law, whether you agree with it or not.
It is not for you to determine whether the law is just or whether the law is unjust. That cannot be your task. There is no such thing as valid jury nullification. You would violate your oath and the law if you willfully brought a verdict contrary to the law given to you in this case. On June 18, , New Hampshire passed a law explicitly allowing defense attorneys to inform juries about jury nullification. The Indiana Constitution allows nullification, but does not require informing the jury of this right: "In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts". From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For the book by Clay Conrad, see Jury Nullification book.
When a jury finds a defendant not guilty because they disagree with a law. See also: Assassination of Talat Pasha. Main article: Jury nullification in the United States. This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. First, policing underwent a move toward professionalization, which brought about improvements such as the use of technology, reliance on evidence rather than confessions given during investigations , and requirements that police undergo more extensive education and standardized training. This type of policing moved in the opposite direction of the call-for-service model by urging officers to heavily and proactively enforce laws against minor criminal activity, particularly in distressed communities. The shift meant that people in racially and socioeconomically isolated communities first felt abandoned, then felt heavily monitored—but primarily monitored only for minor crimes that were not at the heart of their public safety and security concerns.
The War on Drugs altered policing as well. Although much of the critique of the War on Drugs has focused on its hotly debated role in the rise of mass incarceration,, the War on Drugs altered the front end of the criminal justice system—policing—just as significantly. Beginning in the s and increasingly throughout the s and s, the War on Drugs funded special narcotics-enforcement police units and gang units across the country, arming regular police departments with military-grade armor and weaponry, and authorizing virtually free reign over marginalized neighborhoods.
The twin perils of harsh policing and neglectful policing indicate structural exclusion from public safety, an exclusion that corresponds with intersecting race, class, and geographic marginalization. Many young men, too, would ideally want the police to protect them and their communities. Patrick Carr, Laura Napolitano, and Jessica Keating reached this finding in their qualitative criminology study of an ethnically diverse Latinx, white, and African American sample of young men and women, ages twelve to twenty-three, in three high-crime, socioeconomically challenged Philadelphia neighborhoods.
Although most of the youths, regardless of race or gender, had a negative disposition toward the police, most of them—including young African American men—also suggested greater presence of police and harsher enforcement of the law as ways to address crime in their communities. Along with protection, the youths desire procedurally just policing. Lemuel is a twenty-four-year-old African American young man who grew up in the Lexington Terrace housing project in West Baltimore. When I was robbing people, there was a reason why I was doing it. My stomach was literally growling, nothing to do. Either I die, starve, or I do something. I was too young for a job. I mean, I cut grass during the summer.
I shoveled snow through the winter. But [what] do you do in between? Whatever you can do. So we made sure we ate. Not surprisingly, Lemuel had numerous run-ins with the police in his younger, delinquent years. They could either take him to jail, or they could allow him to go home. One day when he was about fifteen years old, Lemuel showed up to school drunk on Bacardi Gold rum. A female officer patted Lemuel down and found the drugs in his pocket. According to Lemuel, the officer grabbed his scrotum and squeezed.
But he returned home swollen and in pain. When Lemuel was younger, someone from his neighborhood robbed him and took his sports jersey, an item that was relatively expensive given his financial background and thus had great significance to him. He wished that he could call the police to report the crime and get the jersey back, but instead he reluctantly fought the older boy who took it. Got my jersey back, though. Lemuel does not think the problems of policing that he has experienced, and that gave rise to the Freddie Gray unrest, are attributable to race.
In his view, the problems of police-community relations are problems of neighborhood income inequality. It matters where you live. He and a friend attempted to burglarize a home in a wealthier part of Baltimore County, and they assumed that because the house was in a semirural area, it would take the police a long time to arrive. They were wrong. Someone called the police, and officers arrived very quickly. I realized that when I went to try to do my first home invasion.
The cop response was so quick. It was so quick. I never seen the cops respond to this neighborhood so quickly. One distinction between the police in West Baltimore and the police where Lemuel attempted the burglary is jurisdictional. The differences between these jurisdictions might relate to their relative emphases on responding to crime reactively versus implementing preventive or proactive approaches. It might be the case that in the county, the police department still places heavy emphasis on responding to calls for service, while in the city particularly in high crime areas , there is greater emphasis on patrolling.
Yet some people—including former police officers—claim that street enforcement units are still given wide discretion that they often grievously misuse. Perhaps because Lemuel was so young, police were slower to arrest him. While we do not have evidence of what those specific officers believed, insider accounts suggest that department policy encouraged greater police presence in predominantly poor and African American neighborhoods, even for officers who were not assigned to those areas. Former Baltimore police officer Michael Wood told reporters that, after getting a plum assignment to an upper-middle-class, predominantly white neighborhood, he would sometimes leave his post to go to a poor, predominantly black neighborhood to make arrests.
So, even though it technically violated policy for Wood to patrol for arrests outside of his post, his supervisors signed off on his work. Even if those people are never arrested, and even if they do not become suspects of any particular crime, this contact might have negative effects on their perceptions of police, reminding them of their relative worthlessness in the eyes of the state. Consequently, arrest-incentivizing policies may serve to deepen legal estrangement.
On a broader scale, of course, structural exclusion through policing is layered atop deeper structural disadvantages that arise in the contexts of growing up poor and African American, and living in the city of Baltimore. Good policing is just one additional resource, or another form of capital, from which the law writ large may exclude people like Shawna, Justin, Jamila, and Lemuel. How can police reform dismantle legal estrangement? There is little scholarship that tackles this question in even a cursory way. Research suggests that procedural justice can unsettle the psychological process that leads people to perceive the police as illegitimate.
Evidence also indicates that the procedural justice solution can effectively increase perceptions of legitimacy across race and, to some extent, class. Measures that emanate from legitimacy theory and the procedural justice approach, such as police training, are ultimately an impoverished response to estrangement. One might reasonably view legal estrangement not as a problem of policing, but as a problem of concentrated poverty and racial inequality. Certainly, as is apparent in the vignettes offered in this Essay, concentrated poverty and systemic racial injustice are major structural problems that produce legal estrangement.
Admittedly, the structural factors believed to contribute most fundamentally to cynicism, such as concentrated poverty, segregation, and residential instability, are not generally seen as the province of police practice and policy. Yet to demand that curing poverty and eliminating race discrimination are the only ways to meaningfully effect change in policing is to accept paralysis. For instance, some scholars have argued that police practices directly contribute to persistent residential segregation. The proposals here are not offered as a cure-all to legal estrangement, but are instead an opening salvo to encourage police reformers to dedicate energy toward new strategies and structures of police governance.
Scholars often overlook many of the structural issues that confront policing outside the purview of federal law because the policing crisis is embedded in state and local laws and policies. Even though federal law and policy has brought some uniformity to local policing through spending initiatives since the s, police administrative rules and practices still vary intensely among states, counties, and municipalities. One tool that provides the federal government with leverage to force local departments to change or eliminate structurally exclusive policies is section of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of , also known as the Clinton Crime Bill.
Attorney General to sue a local police department for engaging in a pattern or practice of violating constitutional and legal rights. The Department of Justice DOJ may use the threat of litigation to reach an agreement with the agency to pursue specific reforms, or take the agency to court and mandate actions through a consent decree. Although section has many merits—for example, the law is credited with providing a path to successful long-term reform for police departments in Cincinnati, Los Angeles, and Pittsburgh —many scholars have offered an array of potential improvements to the law. One of the biggest shortcomings of section is that its use is politically cyclical.
Bush, the DOJ did not enter into a single consent decree with a police agency, opting instead to enter into nonbinding agreements with wayward departments. Baltimore provides an excellent example of this issue. While section provides a helpful backstop, it allows departments to maintain a veneer of community orientation until a crisis strikes. Major pushes for structural reform should not rely on litigation that is rarely initiated before tragedy occurs. While recognizing the inherent insufficiency of incremental interventions as a full remedy for legal estrangement, in this Part, I provisionally discuss Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and four areas of police governance reform that could contribute to dismantling estrangement. These reforms have garnered much less attention in the most recent police reform debates than police training, community policing initiatives, or even structural reform litigation.
Whereas most scholarship on police regulation tends to focus on constitutional criminal procedure, these reforms are aimed at statutory and municipal law at the federal, state, and local levels. Unlike the legitimacy approach, legal estrangement theory directly suggests structural reform: the theory demands attention to group societal membership and the deep-seated laws, policies, and structures that have produced the policing crisis. Microlevel procedural justice reforms aimed at producing individual-level feelings of legitimacy are anemic responses to legal estrangement.
The police wage system is a structural factor that functionally excludes many poor people and African Americans from policing resources, thereby contributing to legal estrangement. The wage structure under which police officers generally operate works inversely to the way it should: some of the busiest and most dangerous jobs in law enforcement often pay the least. Particularly in cities, towns, and counties that are financially strapped, finding the means to retain police-officer talent is a serious challenge. Moreover, officers are frequently aware of localized pay disparities. For example, a journalistic report on St. Low officer wages introduce two major perversions to the system. First, when salaries are too low, the most skilled and experienced officers will rationally leave higher-crime areas to work in easier areas where they are paid more.
The others received substantial amounts of money in what appears to be overtime pay. The stress and burden of extended work hours can make even the most promising officers terrible at their job. It even discusses shift length as a potential contributor to officer fatigue. Wage disparity is a structural issue that occurs far upstream from the events that have catalyzed the police reform movement. Bringing greater transparency and equity to officer salaries will likely decrease procedural injustice and vicarious marginalization on the ground, which could, over time, reduce legal estrangement.
Even where officers are paid on the same scale within the same departments, they still may be earning less to police tougher neighborhoods. Collective bargaining means that departments are often bound to pay salary, assign shifts, assign beats, and give promotions or transfers on the basis of seniority. Seniority rules mean that new patrol officers tend to get the least-desired assignments—graveyard shifts and tough neighborhoods—while receiving the lowest compensation. Since the establishment of the federal Office of Community Oriented Policing Services in , federal funding has flowed to local departments to incentivize various reforms.
State legislation could help as well. The breadth and prevalence of the Detail system has essentially privatized officer overtime at NOPD, resulting in officers working Details in the areas of town with the least crime, while an insufficient number of officers are working in the areas of New Orleans with the greatest crime prevention needs. Those with means in New Orleans are essentially able to buy additional protection, while those without such means are unable to pay for the services and extra protection needed to make up for insufficient or ineffective policing. While any community that wants extra security certainly has a right to pay for it, it raises troubling legal and ethical questions when that extra security might otherwise have been focused on parts of the City most in need of police assistance.
This language might have been a clarion call to municipal governments to prohibit—or at least to regulate more effectively—the use of sworn police officers as private security for overtime pay. It limits its analysis to the particularities of New Orleans, and even suggests an acceptable alternative Paid Detail governance structure. Another option would be to bar sworn police officers from taking on this type of secondary employment altogether. Instead, local governments could expect private entities who want extra security to hire staff through private firms.
Some Seattle neighborhoods have instituted this approach. Secondary employment is thus a mechanism through which poorer communities are structurally excluded from good policing. Officers may receive overtime pay for working as officers in wealthier areas, while they only earn paltry wages to keep distressed neighborhoods safe. This dynamic sends a stark message that protecting wealthier areas is more lucrative than protecting higher-poverty areas. Secondary employment policies like these might even suggest, at least symbolically, that African American and poor lives truly lack value. There are more than twelve thousand police departments in the United States, nearly half of which employ fewer than ten police officers.
Although consolidating districts would not constitute a total reorganization of departments, it might be a strong first step toward creating a structure more amenable to meaningful community engagement and checks on police power. The proliferation of many small police departments means that some neighborhoods can essentially become individual fiefdoms for certain officers. The issue of unchecked power in extremely small rural or suburban police departments came to national attention for a very short time in late , when a South Carolina prosecutor attempted twice to win the conviction of Richard Combs, the police chief and sole police officer in Eutawville, South Carolina—a town with a population of Some onlookers saw Combs as an example of an officer who, because he functioned as the sole traffic officer, regular patrol officer, and police chief, had unfettered power to use the machinery of criminal justice for vindictive purposes—a structure that seems almost destined to produce corrupt police action.
Small departments can also create various interjurisdictional inconsistencies ranging from the amount of training officers receive to the equipment available to keep themselves and civilians safe. This meant that the only means of force he had available was his gun. Moreover, the prevalence of very small departments in close proximity to each other increases the likelihood that an officer fired from one jurisdiction for serious reasons could find work as an officer in another. Indeed, some of the most celebrated efforts to link police and community have taken place in larger departments. By contrast, the sheer volume of locally controlled police departments, all of which have slightly different policies and issues, creates a major barrier to systemic reform.
The seemingly infinite variations on police policy means that scholars and policymakers may observe common problems across local contexts but find it difficult to sufficiently address those problems on a larger scale. Consolidation would help if only because it would decrease the number of departments and make it easier to gain a picture of their policies and practices. Unlike many of the structural reforms proposed in this Part, department consolidation has gained some support from advocates for money saving in criminal justice. After the recession, municipal budgets shrank and many officers were furloughed or laid off.
For one, members of the public who live in very small towns may interpret consolidation of small departments as a cut to their public safety and to local control of their police force. In addition, consolidation would mean that some people who have immense power would be required to yield it. These fundamental issues mean that securing support for department consolidation in local areas will pose a significant challenge.
Because of the longstanding social, cultural, and symbolic meaning of the police among African Americans and in racially and socioeconomically marginalized communities, policing cases—more than others—send messages to groups about social inclusion and, indeed, social citizenship. Legitimacy theory does not offer a consistent mode of response to this problem. What messages are conveyed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence?
To illustrate, we can return to the facts of Strieff. Fackrell had received an anonymous tip that people were selling and purchasing methamphetamine there. Fackrell saw several people enter and leave the home after short periods of time—behavior that, in his view, was consistent with drug dealing and purchasing. Edward Strieff was one of the people who visited the home. On one of these surveillance days, Strieff left the home in question and went to a nearby convenience store. Even though Fackrell only knew that Strieff had visited the home—information that did not amount to reasonable suspicion to justify a search—Fackrell followed Strieff to the convenience store, stopped him, and questioned him about what he was doing at the home in question.
The dispatcher told Fackrell that Strieff had an open warrant for his arrest on a minor traffic violation. Fackrell then arrested Strieff, and in a search incident to arrest, found the evidence he was looking for: Strieff was holding a small baggie of meth and other drug paraphernalia. Why is this case troubling? Fackrell violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping Strieff in the first place; even the prosecutor conceded that point.
In a world where few people had open warrants, this decision might seem somewhat troubling, but not catastrophic. Yet in a scenario where a substantial number of people have open warrants, often for the most minor of infractions, often for noncriminal violations of probation and parole conditions, and often because of their poverty, the Strieff decision authorizes tremendous power. Police officers are now free to arbitrarily and even unconstitutionally stop people, ask them for their identification, have a dispatcher search their record, find an arrest warrant for a long-unpaid parking ticket or a missed appointment with a probation officer, and use that ticket as a reason to conduct any physical search that they would like to conduct.
If they find any contraband, that contraband could be used as evidence in court. While police officers need discretion in order to locate and deter crime, this ruling gives them a worrisome amount of license. In Whren v. United States , the Court ruled, inter alia, that challenges to police investigations based on race-based selective enforcement must proceed through Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis rather than Fourth Amendment analysis. Davis , Whren significantly curtails the degree to which Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on police investigation could be used to correct racial discrimination in the conduct of police investigations.
Thus, state courts might under some circumstances be better suited than federal courts to factor in the local context of racial discrimination and disparity reflective of legal estrangement. This was a judicial acknowledgement of the potential effects of legal estrangement. Judges who rule on the constitutionality of searches should keep in mind the stakes of giving too much leeway to the police, stakes that legal estrangement theory illuminates.
Moreover, some have argued that the text of the Fourth Amendment, emphasizing reasonableness, demands that courts consider distributional outcomes of searches and seizures by race, gender, and other group categories. Legal estrangement demands a deep, meaningful approach to democratizing police governance. Bringing about cohesion and solidarity between police and African American and poor communities will require a more aggressive infusion of deliberative participation in policing than most proposals demand. A legitimacy approach might not object to deep democratization—these processes would arguably make the police more effective in securing voluntary compliance and would arguably encourage the police to use procedurally just methods—but legitimacy would not require it.
Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko have recently argued against police exceptionalism in policymaking. They propose that police policies, such as the use of SWAT teams and warrantless searches, require legislative authorization, administrative rulemaking with notice-and-comment, or some other democratic process similar to other areas of regulation. For a panoply of reasons, ranging from the education gap, to felony disenfranchisement and its chilling effects on turnout in high-incarceration communities, to active efforts at voter suppression, to gerrymandering, to the capture of policymaking through high-stakes lobbying, African Americans—particularly if they live in high-poverty communities—have relatively little say in who their representatives are or in the legislation that their representatives ultimately pass.
However, it is unlikely on its own to unsettle legal estrangement in the communities that are most affected by it. If one suspects that most police interactions go the way that they should, data and transparency can potentially be a boon to solidarity between officers and communities. Data can perhaps put what police actually do most of the time in clearer perspective. When then-State Senator Obama led the Illinois Legislature in passing antiracial profiling legislation in , he emphasized that the purpose of the bill was to collect data on police activity.
He convinced the Fraternal Order of Police that the data would give them an opportunity to show that they were doing valid police work, not engaging in racial discrimination. Yet perhaps an even more effective approach would include ways to make policing more qualitatively transparent—for instance, making videos of regular police work more publicly available, opening access to police departments, and perhaps even finding ways to support more adversarial forms of transparency and accountability, such as organized cop watching. Reconciliation is a third type of democratic reform that the legal estrangement perspective might suggest. Through these two organizations, Kennedy and others engaged in a deep strategy of violence prevention by working with local gangs and bringing those offenders together with key stakeholders, including the police.
The mechanics of this reconciliation proposal remain unclear. The proposal is distinct from prevailing democratic reform recommendations because it takes very seriously the historical roots of legal estrangement, accommodates the complexity of the dynamics between officers and communities, and in some ways meets the Habermasian ideal of a truly deliberative, consent-based approach to policing. However, governments usually use truth and reconciliation processes to address injustices that occurred over a cognizable, bounded time period and involved a fairly identifiable set of wrongdoers.
A key insight that drives the innovation in Operation Ceasefire and other programs is that most of the violence in a community is concentrated within relatively confined networks. Legal estrangement, in contrast, is more dispersed and broadly influential. However, the basic intuitions of reconciliation—intentionally bringing police and communities together to build trust on a group level, and actively reckoning with the collective memories of harsh policing—reflect the type of intensive, deeply democratic process that might produce long-lasting cultural change.
Finally, the legal estrangement perspective raises fundamental questions about the role of police in society. Police—and more broadly, the criminal justice system—have become the primary vehicle through which the state responds to social deprivation. The legal estrangement perspective should encourage serious reflection on whether, and how much, armed officials should inhabit the role of social caretaker. It might be that reforms that enable greater collaboration between police and social services could make the police more legitimate at an individual level—but it might also, in the aggregate, worsen disparities in criminal justice treatment by race and class.
This aggregate effect would increase legal estrangement. Ultimately, the legal estrangement perspective demands a more holistic discussion of institutional competence. A legitimacy analysis often examines institutions in a decontextualized way, assessing whether a particular institution here, the police has legitimacy or not. Legal estrangement encourages a more relational examination of institutions. The frailty of one bundle of institutions—here, the welfare state—might chip away at the legitimacy of the police, of other institutions, and perhaps the state itself. Shrinking the footprint of armed bureaucrats and creating a more robust system of civil supports might bring more legitimacy to these institutions and increase their capacity to produce social inclusion.
This Essay argues that legal estrangement—a theory that focuses on the symbolic and structural marginalization of African Americans and the poor from society—provides richer theoretical grounding for police reform. Legal estrangement theory incorporates procedural justice, a solution derived from legitimacy theory, as a first step toward understanding police distrust among African American and poor communities. Yet legal estrangement surpasses legitimacy theory by fully considering two larger levels at which distrust operates: vicarious marginalization and structural exclusion. Vicarious experiences range from the mistreatment of a friend, as Jamila experienced, or through learning about more distant negative treatment, as Shawna experienced when she learned about the officer rapes.
Drawing on these theoretical insights, I have proposed a number of areas for reform that, taken together, should help create the deep and lasting cultural change that will be required to truly overcome legal estrangement. These reforms range widely, including more technocratic reforms restructuring police wages and consolidating districts , judicial measures rethinking Fourth Amendment levels of interpretation , community-centered measures democratization, reconciliation, and transparency , and a fundamental revisitation of institutional roles shrinking and refining the police footprint while linking it to a shoring up of critical social welfare institutions. These solutions offer a deeper path forward than the legitimacy perspective does, pushing beyond procedural justice.
They do, of course, remain incomplete. The legal estrangement perspective demands taking account of historically rooted group marginalization and the collective consciousness of discrimination and mistreatment. This historical and collective perspective is central to the project of police reform. Accordingly, the perspective sensitizes police reformers to the idea that, while modifications within the institution of policing are critical and should move beyond individual line officers, their work will not be finished until it spurs change in the full array of institutions that perpetuate poverty, race-correlated disadvantage, and symbolic statelessness.
See Mapp v. Ohio, U. Strieff , S. See also Tracey L. See, e. Importantly, the empirical research that led to the legitimacy findings treats legitimacy and trust as related but distinct topics. For example, Tyler and Huo use legitimacy as an umbrella variable that includes trust and confidence in police as one component of the broader concept. Tom R. Huo, Trust in the Law ; see also Tom R. Consider, for example, the case of Antronie Scott, shot and killed on February 4, Consider, for example, the case of Charles Kinsey, shot and injured on July 18, Kinsey, a behavioral therapist who was working with an autistic adult, was shot lying on his back, with his hands in the air.
The facts surrounding the case are complex. Officer Jonathan Aledda, who shot Kinsey, later claimed that he was attempting to shoot the autistic Latino man with whom Kinsey was working; the man was holding a toy gun that the original caller had suggested might be a gun. However, several circumstances surrounding the incident weaken this potential explanation. In general, it is important to note that police uses of force can be unreasonable, and thus punishable, even if the victims were disobeying the law or failing to comply with officer commands.
The test of objective reasonableness in police excessive use of force cases depends on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the use of force at issue, not simply whether the victim was breaking the law or disobeying the officer at the time of the forceful act. See Graham v. Connor, U. Consider, for example, the case of Eric Garner, who suffered a fatal heart attack on July 17, after police attempted to arrest him for selling loose, untaxed cigarettes.
See Al Baker, J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes , 86 Va. One of the perils of broken-windows policing also known as order-maintenance or quality-of-life policing is that its emphasis on enforcing petty laws imbues the police with increased power and focus on social and racial control, particularly in high-poverty, racially marginalized communities. That officers enforce these laws at all likely decreases their legitimacy. Criminal justice contact includes, but is not limited to, police stops, arrests, generalized interaction between police and communities in heavily policed neighborhoods, periods of incarceration, and periods of community supervision including probation and parole.
See Task Force Report, supra note 6, at ; see also id. Note that the training described under Pillar Six officer safety and wellness is primarily safety training e. The key point is that the Report leaves an overarching impression that solving the problems facing twenty-first-century police is a matter of training frontline officers, not restructuring and reimagining policing. Research Forum , U. They form the basis for the core service delivery model that must be used in every citizen encounter to build the support and cooperation necessary to implement community policing more completely throughout the United States.
That talks about day-to-day interactions and learning how to be neutral and how to listen to people. City of Cleveland, No. City of Ferguson, No. It is not what you do, but how you are doing it. It is about doing the right thing all of the time and treating others how you would want to be treated. Tonight Jan. See Donald J. Donald J. Trump realDonaldTrump , Twitter Jan. The Data Disagree , Wash. Post Sept. See Floyd v. City of New York, F. See John J. Sun Jan. See Police Exec. Wesley G. They have been impressed by two decades of research on policing, which has highlighted some of the limitations of the way in which it traditionally has been organized.
Braga, Andrew V. Perry et al. Utah v. Strieff, S. Bookmark not defined. This difference arises not because legitimacy scholars disregard the intrinsic value of inclusion and cohesion, but because those ends are not their outcome or independent variables of interest. Notably, even when this scholarship does discuss inclusion, it does so more from an individualized identity-based framework than a collective one. Because group-sense culture cannot be understood merely as an aggregation of individual perceptions, these analyses are different in kind, not mere differences in scale. See Tom R. Tyler et al. Burghardt Du Bois ed. See W. Schulhofer, Tom R.
The frayed relationship between African Americans and law enforcement was deeply entrenched well before the War on Drugs. Mass incarceration increased in part due to the War, but the issue of racialized policing has much deeper roots. Western, supra note 16, at 58 crediting, partially, the rise of mass incarceration to shifts in the punishment of narcotics crimes. Tracey L. Lawrence D. Fryer, Jr. Research, Working Paper No. This literature is very extensive and cannot be fully cited here, but some foundational works in the development of a sociological perspective on trust are critical to note.
Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory ; S. Although obligation to obey the law is only one component of legitimacy surveys, that component supersedes the others in part because of the conceptual definition of legitimacy. Normative alignment is a slightly different concept, and focuses on the degree to which people believe the police share their values. Empirical Legal Stud. This literature has also, alternatively, conceived of legitimacy as a form of institutional trust in the government. See John Thibaut et al. Fallon, Jr. David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power 24 2d ed. See Beetham, supra note 74, at ; Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, supra note 73, at Ideal types can be roughly understood as archetypes or categories.
Finch eds. See Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber See generally Beetham , supra note 74, at comparing political philosophy and social scientific ideas of legitimacy ; Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution , supra note 73, at comparing sociological legitimacy with moral legitimacy. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word , 95 Yale L. As opposed to the institutional realm, which might focus on other authorities such as the church, the university, the corporation, and so forth.
Beetham , supra note 74, at describing the distinctions between moral and social scientific conceptions of legitimacy. Of course, by this metric, little about policing in racially and socioeconomically isolated neighborhoods could be seen as legitimate given that police governance is rarely subjected to dialogue or even to public process. Indeed, many police officials and unions, today and in the past, view the involvement of civilians in police governance as counterproductive to the work of crime response and deterrence.
Thus, various measures have been taken to curtail their power. In a recent debate over a set of extensive police reforms in Maryland, civilian membership on police accountability boards was reportedly the primary sticking point between the police union and reform advocates. Post Apr. Ultimately, the reform act passed and went into effect with its original language mandating civilian involvement in police accountability removed, leaving it to individual jurisdictions to decide whether to include civilians in reviewing police misconduct complaints. Sun Apr. Buttigieg trans.
Press They are also more likely to agree with police decisions and less likely to be confrontational or hostile toward us. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice? Meares, Tom R. But see Aziz H. Criminology delving deeper into specific police practices that are perceived to be fair or unfair. Although the police legitimacy research has inspired a great deal of legal scholarship, the overwhelming majority of that scholarship has applied the concept to topics other than the regulation of regular police.
Scholars have applied the theory to areas as diverse as juvenile justice, e. Davis L. Solum, Procedural Justice , 78 S. Inquiry applying procedural justice to transitional justice ; Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy , 48 U. For more recent, extended discussions of departmental management as internal procedural justice, see Task Force Report, supra note 6, at 10, 14; and Rick Trinkner, Tom R. John Rappaport proposes second-order regulation of police through means other than the courts in part because of the argument against direct regulation of police through law in the police legitimacy literature.
This impulse should be eschewed not only because of civil libertarian concerns, but also because these tactics make people less likely to cooperate with police to aid in local counterterrorism efforts. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing , Mich. Policing Feb. Bernard E. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment , 78 U. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, U.Radley Balko Drug Prohibition analyzed Radley Balko Drug Prohibition sanctions that resulted from different violations. When the officer found nothing illegal, he Abraham Lincoln Sectionalism to search their car, which, Williams Radley Balko Drug Prohibition, was Radley Balko Drug Prohibition on the other side of the hotel. See EPI b and Radley Balko Drug Prohibition et al.